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Abstract 
Through annual reports, the company provides a lot of voluntary information which is very vital to stakeholders 
and in corporate governance. The main objective of this study is to empirically investigate the impact of 
corporate governance on voluntary information disclosures of quoted companies in Nigeria using data from 385 
annual reports from a sample of 35 quoted companies during 1999 – 2009. The study also adopted Pre and Post 
approach to study the significant difference on information disclosures during pre and post corporate governance 
codes era in Nigeria. A content analysis of the annual reports of sampled companies was carried out with the use 
of a disclosure checklist developed by the researcher. Multiple regression is employed to test the hypothesis of 
the study. The study reveals that corporate governance has significant impact on financial reporting of quoted 
firms in Nigeria and that the level of voluntary disclosure has significantly improved after the introduction of 
corporate governance codes in Nigeria.  
Keywords: Corporate governance, voluntary information disclosures, Disclosure index, financial reporting.  
 
1. Introduction 
In the 1990s, the importance role of corporate governance to financial reporting disclosures was ignored by most 
top management around the world but series of corporate collapse which occurred in early 2000 in developed 
and developing counties has led to researchers to have interest in the mechanisms of corporate governance and 
their contributions to the company (Wan Zanani, Shahnaz & Nurasyikin, 2008). In fact, the sudden demise of 
large, well-established companies such as Enron, WorldCom or Parmalat as well as significant financial 
reporting restatements at Shell, Xerox, Ahold and many others have shaken not only confidence in financial 
reporting, but into the financial system as a whole (Berndt and Leibfried, 2007). All these corporate failures have 
now made financial reporting to become a global issue. In Berndt & Leibfried (2007), financial reporting today 
is perceived no longer as a low-priority bookkeeping exercise, but a central function for directing a company 
under good corporate governance principles. 
Information disclosure in annual reports comprises of both mandatory and voluntary disclosures. Mandatory 
disclosures are those statutorily required to be disclosed by companies while voluntary disclosures are added 
information in annual reports which are in excess of disclosure requirements and  relates to freedom of managers 
to disclose such in the annual reports without any compulsion. The need for voluntary disclosures emanates from 
the fact that financial reports must be capable of meeting the needs of the various categories of users and also 
serves as a basis for investment decisions by investors and other stakeholders. Berndt and Leibfried (2007) 
opined that it has become evident that financial reporting is a core element of corporate governance within the 
past few years 
On June 15, 2000, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in collaboration with Corporate Affairs 
Commission (CAC) inaugurated a 17 member committee for setting up Corporate Governance codes for public 
companies in Nigeria, with the belief that the adoption of these codes by firms in Nigeria will improve corporate 
disclosures thereby enhancing transparency and accountability. In view of this importance of Corporate 
Governance, the first codes of corporate governance in Nigeria were issued in 2003. To strengthen shareholders 
and investors confidence on the financial reports laid before them for investment decision, several measures and 
principles of Codes of Best practices prescribed by Central Bank of Nigeria, (CBN), Securities and Exchange 
Commission, (SEC) and other regulatory bodies in Nigeria has been severally amended to date. In an effort to 
improve the financial reporting process, companies in Nigeria especially listed companies, are expected to 
comply with the established various Codes of Corporate Governance and to make adequate disclosures in their 
annual reports.  
The sudden failure of several famous and large companies in Nigeria and globally have cast doubts on 
stakeholder’s confidence on information disclosed by corporate entities. This widespread failure of corporate 
entities resulting from poor disclosures has necessitated the need for improvement in financial information 
disclosures by setting up good corporate governance structures.  
In the Nigeria sector, empirical studies reveal that accounting reports of Nigerian companies have been found to 
be deficient over time (Wallace, 1988; Umoren, 2010). Adeyemi and Fagbemi (2010) in Chima (2012) 
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highlighted that some cases of the failure of Nigerian Banks, the case of Lever Brothers (presently known as 
Unilever plc), African Petroleum, Cadbury Nigeria plc and host of others has been linked to poor financial 
reporting and weak corporate governance. CBN Codes, (2006) noted that the corporate failures in companies 
which had earlier enjoyed good reputation, has been severally criticized and seen as being a product of poor 
corporate governance. SEC (2007) pointed out that virtually all the reported cases of corporate failure both 
locally and internationally has been traced to poor corporate governance practices.  
Globally, the users of corporate information have intensified their expectation for published corporate disclosure 
to meet their needs. However, such disclosures rarely meet such needs because of information asymmetry 
between the managers and the owners as well as other stakeholders. The managers are likely to use information 
at their disposal to pursue their own interests to the detriment of the owners. This has always led to an increase in 
the gap between what is expected by users and what is actually disclosed. This can be called the disclosure gap.   
Motivated by the assertion that the adoption of corporate governance codes by Nigeria companies will improve 
corporate voluntary information disclosures and enhance financial reporting credibility of annual reports, this 
research contributes to the growing knowledge on corporate governance by empirically investigating the impact 
that Corporate Governance Codes for quoted companies in Nigeria has on voluntary disclosures. Also, the study 
adopted a pre and post approach to examine the extent of voluntary information disclosures by quoted firms in 
Nigeria.  
Consequently, the objectives of this study are to:  
• Evaluate the aggregate impact of Corporate Governance mechanisms on voluntary information 
disclosures of quoted firms in Nigeria as well as to investigate the relationship between each of the corporate 
governance variables on voluntary disclosure. 
• Examine whether there is any difference on voluntary information disclosure by quoted firms 
in Nigeria before and after the introduction of the Codes of Corporate Governance in Nigeria.  
According to Chima (2012), several groups of people have interest in company’s affairs due to their investments 
or anticipated investments, hence understanding why firms disclose information as well as what affects the 
firms’ voluntarily discloses will be very significant to them. Findings from this study will be significant to 
government, investors, regulatory bodies, researchers, accountants, stockbrokers, financial analysts and scholars 
as financial reporting is a useful mechanism for managers to communicate with outside parties.  
The overall disclosure index generated from the checklist of this study and the factors influencing disclosure are 
expected to assist local and foreign investors in making more informed decisions.   
This study will also help the management of quoted companies to assess their level of voluntary information 
disclosure using the disclosure index score generated by this research with a view of improving on their 
disclosure practices.  
This research work is a contribution in the area of Corporate Governance and voluntary information disclosures. 
Hence, it will be significant to future researchers, academicians and the public.  
1.2. Research Hypothesis  
In Nigeria, the CBN code on corporate governance (2006) highlighted that poor corporate governance was one 
of the major factors for virtually all known cases of distress experienced by the financial institutions. In Ghofar 
and Sarasvati, (2009) corporate governance mechanisms are expected to reduce information asymmetry and 
opportunistic behavior of firms thus resulting to the need for more voluntary disclosures. According to Ho and 
Wong (2001), the impact of corporate governance on information disclosure may be complementary or it may be 
substantive. Hence, the following hypothesis; 
H1:  There is no significant impact of corporate governance mechanisms on voluntary information disclosures of 
firms quoted in the Nigerian Stock Exchange.  
Several studies carried out to study the relationship between the type of information presented by a firm and the 
size of the Board of Directors has revealed divergent findings. Jensen (1993) believes that larger board of 
directors is less amenable to effective monitoring and easier control by the CEO. Ahmed, Hossain & Adams 
(2006); in their studies found that large board size reduces voluntary information contents. Based on this, we are 
led to state the following hypothesis:  
H2: There is no significant relationship between board size and voluntary information disclosure of quoted firms 
in Nigeria.  
Peasnell, Pope and Young, (2000) states that, independent non executive directors being senior managers, should 
be aware of the financial reporting issues in the company. In the study of Australian firms, (Lim, Matolcsy and 
Chow, 2007) argued that both inside and independent directors of Australia firms have incentives to disclose 
voluntary information to protect their reputation in terms of decision control, setting of executive compensation 
and searching for replacements for senior managers.  Hence, our hypothesis is stated as follows:  
H3: There is no significant relationship between board composition and voluntary information disclosure of 
quoted firms in Nigeria.   
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Directors are encouraged to have their own portion of ownership in the corporation. Jensen and Meckling, (1976) 
argued that agency conflicts between managers and shareholders may be reconciled when managers posses 
ownership interest in their company. This was also supported by Wan Zanani, et al, (2008) which believes that 
the rationale behind directors, especially non executive directors possessing an ownership interest in their 
company is to reduce a gap between director’s interest and the interest of the shareholders as well as the 
corporation. Hence, we are led to state the following hypothesis;  
H4: There is no significant relationship between Directors share ownership and voluntary information disclosure 
of listed firms in Nigeria.  
Corporate governance is an important element in monitoring the process of financial reporting system (Wan 
Zanani, et al, 2008). The CBN Codes (2003), describes Corporate Governance as a mechanism for building 
credibility, ensuring transparency and accountability as well as maintaining an effective channel of information 
disclosures for corporate entities. In Umoren,(2010), it was highlighted that the level of reliable and adequate 
information by quoted companies in developing countries has been weak and regulatory bodies are not doing 
much in ensuring compliance to existing accounting standards. Previous studies reveal that the financial 
reporting practices in Nigeria have been deficient (Umoren, 2010; Wallace, 1988; World Bank, 2004). Based on 
this, we will test the following hypothesis;  
H5: Voluntary information disclosures after the introduction of corporate Governance codes are not significantly 
different from voluntary information disclosure before the introduction of corporate governance codes in Nigeria. 
The scope of financial reporting disclosures in this research in limited to voluntary information disclosures by 
companies quoted on the Nigeria Stock Exchange. The study covered eleven (11) years (1999 to 2009) which is 
further segmented into two era; Pre - Corporate Governance codes era (1999 - 2003) and post Corporate 
Governance Codes era (2005 - 2009). The remaining parts of the research are structured as follows:  
In section two we reviewed several literatures on corporate governance and financial reporting disclosures and 
their findings reported.  The methodology adopted to lend empirical weight to the findings of this research work 
was discussed in section three. Section four is on results from data analysis and discussion of results.  The last 
section is where the research study is summarized, conclusions inferred from the findings and policy 
implications of the study are discussed.   
 
2.  Information Disclosures and Corporate Governance Mechanisms.   
A lot of studies have indicated a substantial increase in discussions in annual report and some of the studies 
reveal poor and inconsistent information disclosures in accounts of companies. The experience from the case of 
Enron, Worldcom, Pamalet, Cadbury and other big companies is that it has caused the government and 
regulatory bodies to work towards ensuring the restoration of public confidence in corporate governance as well 
as in the credibility of financial statements. According to Chima,(2012), a good financial report must not only be 
capable of providing users with mandatory disclosures but as well go extra mile in providing voluntary 
information disclosures so as to meet the needs of the various categories of users. Providing information on 
which sound investment decision can be made is the goal of all disclosure requirements so as to reduce 
uncertainties and understand as much as possible the values of the company as can be inferred from its reports 
(Glassman, 2003). Fama and Jensen (1983) highlights that financial reports are the most important source of 
information for various stakeholders who use then for investing, controlling and regulatory decisions. According 
to Whittington, (1993), financial reporting provides the means to give adequate information about the economic 
and financial corporate situation so that it will be able to reduce the information asymmetries between the 
stakeholders 
In Klai and Omri (2011), it has been strongly debated that there is a relationship between corporate governance 
and the financial information reported. Financial reporting is a crucial element necessary for the corporate 
governance system to function effectively. Section 3.16 of the CBN Codes (2006), states that transparency and 
adequate disclosure of information is the key attribute of corporate governance. Corporate firms can easily raise 
capital if the firm has a good reputation with regards to financial reporting as Levitt (2000) opined that good 
corporate governance is recognized to influence the financial reporting process and will go a long way in 
restoring investor’s confidence. Wang & Zezhen (2011) opined that voluntary disclosures replenish compliance 
disclosures and this have a way of improving the financial reporting process.  
Several mechanisms enshrined in the corporate governance codes primarily rests in the hands of the board of 
directors. Adams et al (2009) reveals that the fallout from the collapse of Enron, Worldcom, and Parmalat 
scandals shows that the directors of Enron and Worldcom, in particular, were held liable for the fraud that 
occurred: Enron directors had to pay $168 million to investor plaintiffs, of which $13 million was out of pocket 
(not covered by insurance); and Worldcom directors had to pay $36 million, of which $18 million was out of 
pocket.  The consequence of these scandals and ongoing concerns about corporate governance shows that the 
boards have been at the center of the policy debate concerning governance reform and the focus of considerable 
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academic research Adams et al (2009). According to Hongxia & Ainian (2008) firms with high managerial 
ownership have high level of voluntary disclosure as the managers will be more concerned about the benefit of 
shareholders, thereby leading to a reduction in agency cost and increase the voluntary disclosures. Empirical 
studies on board size and financial reporting includes Dechow et al. (1996) which suggested an average board 
size of Nine Directors subject to SEC enforcement actions as being adequate for a firm. Jensen 1993 and 
Yermack (1996) found in their studies that an overcrowded Board is likely to be an ineffective board. Corporate 
governance codes recommends that board size should not be too big and an ideal size of five to sixteen 
depending on the size and diversification of the firm. Jensen (1993) believes that large boards tend to be more 
inclined to courtesy and political maneuvers instead of being fair and truthful.  
Board composition has been defined from various perspectives, including race/ethic background, nationality, 
gender and age, educational background, industry background, and relative experience (Kang, Cheng & Gray, 
2007). Several studies found that there is a positive correlation between the proportion of independent directors 
and the amount of voluntary information disclosed by firms in their annual reports (Xiao and Yuan, 2007; Cheng 
& Courtenay, 2006; Chen and Jaggi, 2000; Lim et al, 2007). Cheng and Courtenay (2006) observed that firms 
with high proportion of independent directors will have higher level of information disclosure than firms with 
lower level of directors. Some studies show an inverse relationship between non executive directors and 
information disclosure.  Ho and Wong, (2001) opined that voluntary information disclosure reduces when the 
proportion of independent board increase.  
2.1 Regulatory Framework for Financial Reporting in Nigeria.  
In Nigeria, the frameworks of financial reporting are the Companies and Allied Matters Act, CAMA (1990), 
Securities and Exchange Commission Act, SECA (2003), Corporate Governance codes and pronouncements 
issued by Nigerian Accounting Standard Board (NASB) now known as Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria 
(FRCN) amongst others.  
In 2003, a committee led by Peterside Atedo developed corporate governance codes of best practices for public 
companies in Nigeria. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 1999 defines 
corporate governance as “a system by which corporations are directed and controlled. The corporate governance 
structure specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among different participants in the corporation 
such as, the board, managers, shareholders and other stakeholders, and spells out the rules and procedure for 
making decisions on corporate affairs. By doing this, it also provides the structure through which the company’s 
objectives are set and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance’’.  
The emergence of mega Banks in the post consolidation era prompted the CBN to issue a new code of CG for 
Banks in 2006. In the CBN Codes (2006), corporate governance is defined as a system by which corporations are 
governed and controlled with a view to increasing shareholders value and meeting the expectations of the 
stakeholders. 
Also to address the weakness of the 2003 code, the Nigeria Securities and Exchange Commission in the year 
2009 published the revised code of corporate governance for best practices for public companies in Nigeria. The 
SEC is given the power to regulate and supervise the affairs of listed companies as well as to discipline them 
through its powers to revoke their registration.  
The CAC is also empowered to cause an investigation to be carried out on companies when such company fails 
to give accurate information in respect to the affairs of the company.  
2.2 Underlying Theory  
Several theories have been developed on why firms should disclose voluntary information and the need to 
provide a detailed financial report by those entrusted in the management of company’s affairs. The entity theory, 
the proprietary theory, institutional theory, political economy theory, resource dependence theory, stakeholders 
theory and the agency theory all agree that all companies reveal information mostly for traditional user groups 
and for investment decisions.  
The agency theory applies to the relationship between managers and equity holders as well as explicit 
recognition of other stakeholders of the firm. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), agency theory provides 
a framework linking information disclosure behaviors to corporate governance. The agency theory posits that in 
the presence of information asymmetry the agent (the directors and managers) is likely to pursue interests that 
may hurt the principal, or shareholders (Ahmadu, Aminu & Tukur, 2005). Hence, the agency theory is the 
underpinning theory for this research work and fundamental theory upon which this research study is based as it 
provides a framework linking information disclosure behaviors to corporate governance. 
 
3.  Research Methodology and Design  
This research work is designed to use the content analysis of annual reports of a cross sectional companies to 
empirically determine the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on voluntary information disclosures of 
quoted companies in the Nigeria Stock Exchange. This research study relies on data from annual report and 
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accounts of quoted companies in Nigeria as a source of data collection and through the construction of a 
disclosure checklist to derive a disclosure index score. The statistical data was analyzed using SPSS 16.0 version. 
Three corporate governance variables – board size, non executive directors in proportion to the board size and 
directors shareholdings, were used to empirically investigate the impact of corporate Governance on information 
disclosures by firms in Nigeria. This approach has been used by other researchers to measure the extent of 
information disclosures by quoted companies in both developed and developing countries (Raffournier, 1995; 
Wallace, 1988; Cook, 1989; Meek et al, 1995;Umoren, 2010; Umoren & Okougbo, 2011).  
3.1 Sample Selection and Data Collection 
The population for the analysis is all the companies listed in the Nigerian Stock Exchange as at year 2009.  The 
sample size was determined using the formula in Miaoulis & Michener (1976). The formula is stated thus: 
                                        n = N/1 +N (e) 2;          (1) 
Where: n = sample size, N = Population size, e = level of precision. Thus: n = 219/1+219(0.16)2 = 33.1496 
companies. The simple random sampling technique of all the quoted companies was used. The lottery method 
was applied in selecting the 35 companies from the population of 219 companies quoted on the Nigeria Stock 
Exchange as at 31st December, 2009. A total of 385 annual reports and accounts were used.  
For the purpose of this study, the Annual Reports of sampled companies as well as Fact Books from the NSE 
was used to collect data.   
3.2 Disclosure Checklist and Scoring Criteria  
The disclosure checklist was developed after a review of previous checklist used by previous reseachers. These 
includes the checklist used in Khodadadi (2010), Clemente & Labet (2009), Meek et al (1995), Umoren & 
Okougbo (2011), Zhou & Panbuyueng, (2008), Lim et al (2007), Wang & Zezhen (2011). The disclosure 
checklist is made up of 25 information items (Appendix 1). It covered voluntary disclosures in such areas as 
financial, non financial as well as strategic information disclosures. Each annual report was carefully studied and 
scored based on the checklist developed by the researcher. This methodology has been used by several 
researchers over time as an adequate model for analyzing financial information disclosure in annual reports of 
companies (Cooke, 1989; Chow & Wong – Boren, 1987; Wallace, 1988; Raffournier, 1995; Umoren, 2010; and 
Wang & Zezhen, 2011).   
The two important issues in previous research on the scoring of disclosure items is whether the disclosure item 
should be weighed or un weighed. Barako, (2007) stressed that the weighed approach may introduce a bias 
towards a particular user orientation, while the unweighed approach dwells on the assumption that all items are 
equally important which might not be true. The weighed scoring criterion has been criticized by some 
researchers. Using the weighed approach leads to one class of user attaching different weight to an item than 
another user (Chavent et al (2006). The unweighed index helps in avoiding any bias arising from weighing such 
as making any particular disclosure more important than the other. The unweighed approach is also not without 
its own criticisms. Raffournier,(1995) shows that a methodological problem inherent in this type of research is 
that every item may not be necessarily be relevant. 
This research study used unweighted index to avoid any bias arising from weighing such as making a particular 
disclosure more important than the other. Each item scores one (1) if disclosed in the annual reports and zero (0) 
if otherwise. It is based on the assumption that all items are equally important and since different users pay 
attention to different information, we decided not to attach importance to the different disclosures or weigh their 
importance.  
3.3 Model Specification  
The Regression equation empirical model for this research is given as:    
        FRDINDEX = βo + β1BS + β2 BCnEx + β3DirSHARE + e                    (2)  
        FRDINDEX = βo + β1BS + β2 BCnEx + β3DirSHARE + β4FS + β5PFT + e                            (3) 
FRDINDEX = Financial Reporting Disclosure Index. 
BS = Board size (the number of Directors on the board of each company).  
BCnEx = Proportion of the non executive directors to the total board size. 
DirSHARE = proportion of the Directors shareholding of the company’s issued share capital. 
FS = Firm size, PFT = Profitability, 
                          FRDINDEX   = ∑ i=1 nj xij         (4) 
                                               Njj   
 
4. Results    
A total of 385 annual reports of 35 companies that made up the sample size were analyzed. The eleven sectors 
that made up the sample size are: Agriculture, Banking, Breweries, Chemical and Paints, Conglomerates, 
Construction, Food / Beverages and Tobacco, Healthcare, Industrial and Domestic Products, Insurance and Oil 
and Gases. The relationship between the two variables was estimated using multiple regression models and the 
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hypothesis tested using T – test statistics and one way ANOVA. The results from the data are analyzed below.  
                            
Table 1: Correlations matrix 
 FRDI BS BCnEx DSH FS PFT 
Pearson 
correlation   FRDI 
 .269 -.276 -.075 .462 .390 
                                      
BS 
.269  -.143 -.176 .519 .446 
                                   
BCnEx 
-.276 -.143  -.072 -.195 -.156 
                                      
DSH 
-.075 -.176 -.072  -.119 -.088 
                                      
FS 
.462 .519 -.195 -.119  .679 
                                      
PFT 
.390 .446 -.156 -.088 -.679  
Sig.  ( 1 tailed )           
FRDI 
 .000 .000 .072 .000 .000 
                                      
BS 
.000  .002 .000 .000 .000 
                                   
BCnEx 
.000 .002  .079 .000 .001 
                                      
DSH 
.072 .000 .079  .010 .042 
                                      
FS 
.000 .000 .000 .010  .000 
                                      
PFT 
.000 .000 .001 .042 .000  
N (listwise) 385      
 Source: Regression output  
The table 1 above shows the linear relationship amongst the independent variables. Board size has a direct 
relationship with FRDI with a weak correlation of 0.269. Proportion of non executive directors and directors’ 
shareholdings has an inverse relationship with FRDI with a negative correlation of -0.276 and -0.075 
respectively. Firm size has a direct linear relationship with FRDI with a moderate correlation of 0.462 while 
profitability has a direct relationship with FRDI with a weak positive correlation of 0.390.  
 
Table 2: Model Summaryb 
Model R R square Adjusted  R square Std. Error of the estimate Sig. F change Dubin Watson 
1 .364a .133 .126 3.36386 .000 1.652 
 Source: Regression output  
In table 2 above, the coefficient of multiple determination (R2) shows that 13.3% of the variation in disclosure 
index could be explained by the predictors variables. The adjusted R2 which represents the goodness of fit of the 
data shows that 12.6% of the variation in disclosure index could be explained by the predictor variables. The 
remaining could be due to other factors.  
 
Table 3: ANOVAb 
Model 1 Sum of squares Df Mean square F P- Values 
Regression 658.52 3 219.51 19.40 .000a 
Residual 4311.22 381 11.32   
Total 4969.74 384    
 Source: Regression output  
The output in Table 3 above shows the F statistics at 5% significance level for assessing the overall significance 
of the analysis of variance of the regression and residuals.            
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Table 4: Model Summaryb 
Model R R square Adjusted  R square Std. Error of the estimate Sig. F change Dubin Watson 
2 .510a .260 .250 3.11487 .000 1.838 
 Source: Regression output  
 a. predictors: (constant), BS, BCnEx, DSH, FS, PFT. 
 b. Dependent Variable: FRDI 
Table 4 shows the model summary of the independent variables including firm size and profitability. The 
correlation coefficient (R) of 0.510 tells us that the predictor variable has a moderate relationship with FRDI. 
The coefficient of multiple determinations is 26.0% while the adjusted R2 which represents the goodness of fit 
of the data shows that 25% of the variation in FRDI could be explained by the predictors variables.  
 
Table 5: ANOVAb 
Model 1 Sum of squares Df Mean square F P- Values 
Regression 1292.52 5 258.504 26.64 .000a 
Residual 3677.22 379 9.702   
Total 4969.74 384    
 Source: Regression output  
 a. predictors: (constant), BS, BCnEx, DSH,FS, PFT. 
 b. Dependent Variable: FRDI 
The output in Table 5 above shows the F statistics at 5% significance level for assessing the overall significance 
of the analysis of variance of the regression and residuals.            
 
Table 6: Coefficentsa 
Model 1 Constant BS BCnEX DSHARE FSIZE PFT 
Standardized 
coefficient (B) 
10.59 .006 -.193 -.037 .327 .131 
Standard Error .962 .060 1.088 1.880 .000 .000 
Sig. .000 .006 .000 .412 .000 .032 
 Source: Regression output  
Table 6 above shows the output of the correlation coefficients of the explanatory variables on the explained 
variable from the model. Apart from director’s shareholding, other variables show significant values at 5% level 
of significance. 
 
Table 7:  Descriptive statistics 
Observation N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Pre CGc disclosures 175 1.00 16.00 6.3657 2.72134 
Post CGc disclosures 175 2.00 19.00 9.7029 3.72360 
Valid (N) listwise                                                                                               
175 
 
 Source: Regression output  
From Table 7, the pre corporate governance era shows a minimum disclosure of 1.00, maximum disclosure of 
16.00 and a mean disclosure of 6.3657. However, the post corporate governance era shows a minimum value of 
2.00, maximum disclosure of 19.00 and a mean disclosure of 9.7029. 
 
Table 8: Independent Samples Test 
Levene’s Test 
for Equality of 
Variance 
T – test for 
Equality of 
Means 
    
 F P-Value T Df Sig. (2 tailed) 
Observations      
Equal Variance 
assumed 
21.486 .000 -9.572 348.0 .000 
Equal Variance 
not assumed 
  -9.572 318.62 .000 
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Table 9: ANOVA 
Observations Sum of squares Df Mean square F P- Values 
Between Groups 974.45 1 974.45 91.62 .000a 
Within Groups 3701.14 348 10.64   
Total 4675.59 349    
Source: Regression output  
Table 8 above shows the p- values of 0.000 which is significant at 5% level of significance. Also table 9 shows 
the F statistics at df (1,348) is 91.62 with a p – value of 0.000 which is also significant.   
 
Table 10: Collinearity Statistic 
Model Tolerance Variance inflation factor (VIF) 
BS .699 1.431 
BCnEx .948 1.055 
DSH .957 1.045 
FS .474 2.108 
PFT .526 1.901 
Source: Regression output  
To assess for the presence of multicollinearity, Tolerance Value and the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) are 
examined. In Chavent et al, 2006; Field, 2006; Umoren, 2010, multicollinearity does not constitute a problem 
when the VIF does not exceed 10 and the Tolerance Value of each of the variable is above 0.2. The test results as 
shown in Table 10 below shows that there is no multicollinearity problem among the independent variables.  
The Durbin–Watson statistic is a test statistic used to detect the presence of autocorrelation in the model. The 
Durbin-Watson statistic denoted by the letter d ranges in value from 0 to 4. If the Durbin–Watson statistic is 
substantially less than 2 or toward 0, this indicates positive autocorrelation, that is, there is evidence of positive 
serial correlation (Durbin and Watson 1951).  Durbin & Watson, (1951); Wikipedia Encyclopedia, (2009), 
highlights that there may be serious cause for alarm if the test is less than 1.0. The Durbin Watson output from 
the model is 1.838, DL is 1.72 and DU is 1.82 (Table 4). This shows that there is no presence of autocorrelation 
in the model.  
4.1 Discussion of Findings  
The results in Table 2, shows that there is a significant impact of corporate governance on financial reporting 
disclosure of quoted firms in Nigeria. The p – value of 0.000 is less than the significant value of 0.05. 
Furthermore, with ANOVA statistics at 5% level of significance from table 3, the results of F- test shows that 
FCAL is 19.399, while the critical value of FTAB at df (3,381) is 2.60. Hence the Null hypothesis is rejected and 
the conclusion that there is a significant impact of corporate governance on financial reporting disclosures of 
quoted firms in Nigeria. The coefficient of multiple determination (R2) shows that 13.3% of the variation in 
financial reporting disclosures could be explained by the predictors. The adjusted R2 shows that 12.6% of the 
variations in the explained variable could be explained by the predictors. The introduction of control variables in 
the model shows that other factors; apart from corporate governance variables also has impact on information 
disclosure. The result from table 4 shows that 26% of the variation in financial reporting disclosures could be 
explained by the predictors.  The p – value of 0.000 is less than 0.05 showing that there is a significant impact of 
corporate governance on financial reporting disclosure of quoted firms in Nigeria. This is further validated with 
the result from the ANOVA statistics at 5% level of significance. From table 5, the results of F- test shows that 
FCAL is 26.673, which is > the critical value of FTAB of 2.21 at df (5,384). Hence, the conclusion that 
corporate governance has significant impact on financial reporting. Unlike the findings in Wang and Zezhen 
(2011) which found out that corporate governance is not an important tool in improving voluntary disclosures in 
China, this result agrees with the findings in Hongxia & Ainian (2008), Clemente & Labert (2009) and Umoren, 
(2011). 
The correlations matrix in table 1 shows that voluntary information disclosure has a direct relationship with 
board size, firm size and profitability. The correlation values are 0.269, 0.462 and 0.390 respectively.  In table 6, 
the t- test for board size shows a sig value of .000 which is less than 0.05. The Null hypothesis is rejected and we 
conclude that there is a significant relationship between board size and financial reporting disclosures. This is in 
agreement with the conclusions of (Monks & Minnow, 1995; Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; Umoren, 2010).  
Table 6 shows a sig value of .000 for board composition. However, the correlations matrix in table 1 however 
shows a negative correlation value of -0.276 for the relationship between Board compositions as it relates to non 
executive directors and voluntary information disclosure. This shows that there is an inverse relationship 
between the proportions of non executive directors. The coefficient in table 6 shows that increasing the 
proportion of non executive directors will lead to a decrease in voluntary disclosures. The t – test shows a value 
of 0.000 which is less than the significant value of 0.05. The Null hypothesis is rejected and we conclude that 
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there is an inverse significant relationship between board composition and voluntary information disclosures. 
This agrees with the findings in Ho & Wong, 2011; Zhou & Panbunyuen, 2008; Umoren, 2010.  
The correlation in table 1 and 6 shows that Directors shareholding of the companies issued share capital is 
insignificant in determining the voluntary information disclosure pattern of Nigeria companies. The t – test result 
shows a value of 0.075 which is greater than the significant value of 0.05. The Null hypothesis is accepted and 
we conclude that there is no significant relationship between director’s shareholding and voluntary information 
disclosures in Nigeria.  
The results from the t- test shows that only board size has a positive value while board composition and directors 
shareholding has negative values. This also reaffirms the findings in Akhtaruddin et al (2009), Umoren, (2010) 
that board size is the only statistical corporate governance variable that has significance on voluntary information 
disclosure in Nigeria. Firm size and profitability however shows a direct relationship with financial reporting 
disclosures with a value of 0.462 and 0.390 respectively. This agrees with previous findings that larger firms 
disclose more information than smaller ones.  
In table 7, the disclosures before the introduction of codes of corporate governance a mean disclosure value of 
6.365 while the disclosure after the introduction of codes of corporate governance shows a mean disclosure value 
of 9.7029. This shows that voluntary information disclosures for the pre and post corporate governance era differ. 
Also, from the result of independent sample test and ANOVA in tables 8 and 9 used in testing the hypothesis the 
p value of 0.000 < 0.05 and the F statistics shows that the FCAL of 91.622 is > the value of FTAB of 3.34 at df 
(1,348). The Null hypothesis is rejected and we conclude that financial reporting disclosure after the introduction 
of corporate governance is significantly different from the disclosure before the introduction of corporate 
governance codes in Nigeria. This can also be seen in the empirical result as the disclosure index score rose from 
7.4 in 1999 to 15.525 in 2009. This shows a significant improvement in financial reporting after the introduction 
of CG codes.  
The results from the multicollinerity test conducted with the use of Tolerance test and Variance Inflation test 
shows that there is an absence of multicollinerity among the explanatory variables (Table 10). Similarly, the 
Autocorrelation test carried out with the use of Durbin Watson computed figures and Durbin Watson Tables 
reveals the absence of autocorrelation in the model.  
 
5.  Summary of Findings  
This study empirically investigates the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on voluntary information 
disclosures of listed firms in Nigeria from 1999 to 2009 using three hundred and eighty five annual reports from 
thirty five companies. The corporate governance variables used are board size, proportion of non executive 
directors on the board and the director’s shareholdings. A multiple regression model was developed to test the 
hypothesis formulated at 5% level of significance. The result shows that corporate governance mechanisms have 
a significant impact in increasing voluntary information disclosures of quoted firms in Nigeria. The result also 
reveals that board size is significant in influencing the extent of voluntary information disclosures of firms in 
Nigeria. The statistical output reveals that the average board size of Nigerian listed companies has been 9.3403. 
The result also reveals that the proportion of non executive directors of Nigerian companies is about 67% and 
has an inverse relationship with voluntary information disclosure while director’s shareholding is about 4% and 
has no significant relationship with information disclosure.  The regression results also confirm previous findings 
that firm size and profitability are other companies’ attributes that has impact on information disclosure of 
Nigeria companies.  
5.1 Conclusion and Recommendations  
Firstly, the introduction of codes of corporate of best practices has significantly improved voluntary information 
disclosures of firms in Nigeria. The result shows that corporate governance mechanisms have an aggregate 
impact on voluntary information disclosure of quoted firms in Nigerian. Secondly, we can conclude that board 
size is one of the major elements of corporate governance that influences voluntary disclosures of Nigerian listed 
firms. Thirdly, apart from the corporate governance variables, the study confirms that firm size and profitability 
also have a significant relationship with information disclosure.  
Based on the empirical findings of this research, the following recommendations are made;   
The empirical result shows that corporate governance mechanisms have aggregate positive impact on voluntary 
information disclosures. Hence the study recommends that reviews of the corporate governance codes be 
sustained. We however argue that the proliferation of different corporate governance codes in Nigeria might 
make it difficult for firms to comply due to contradictions amongst the numerous codes. This study thus 
recommends that all the differences in all the various corporate governance codes be harmonized for effective 
implementation and compliance with a view of improving voluntary disclosures.  
The empirical findings also show an increase in voluntary disclosure at an average board size of 9.39. We 
therefore recommend that the average board size of quoted companies in Nigeria should remain as prescribed by 
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SEC. 
Empirical result also shows that firm size has a significant impact on voluntary information disclosure, meaning 
that larger firms have the tendency to disclose more voluntary information than smaller firms. This means that 
some relevant information needed for investment decision might not be disclosed by some smaller firms because 
of the firms’ size. We therefore recommend to regulatory authorities in Nigeria for a review of mandatory 
disclosure requirement with a view of making some voluntary disclosures mandatory irrespective of the firms’ 
size.  
This research used only three corporate governance variables to study voluntary information disclosures in 
Nigeria. Further research could be carried out by including more corporate governance variables such as Audit 
committee characteristics, auditor’s reputation etc to study their impact on voluntary disclosures.  
Empirical result from this study shows an average board size of nine (9) directors. Since there is a relationship 
between board size and information disclosure, further research could be carried out to study the optimal board 
size that will enhance information disclosure of quoted companies in Nigeria.  
This study used thirty five companies which covered only eleven sectors of companies quoted in the Nigerian 
Stock Exchange and did not study the impact of corporate governance mechanism on information disclosure on 
sectoral classification. Further research can be carried out in this area with the companies being classified 
sectorally.  
On 3rd September, 2010, the Nigerian Accounting Standard Board (NASB) now referred to as Financial 
Reporting Council of Nigeria (FRCON) announced a staged implementation of International Financial Reporting 
Standard (IFRS) with the expectation that all publicly quoted entities are to implement IFRS commencing from 
January 2012 and ending January 2014. The adoption of IFRS – a guideline created by International Accounting 
Standard Board (IASB), is intended to strengthen the financial reporting frameworks of firms in Nigeria. Further 
research could be carried out on both voluntary and mandatory disclosures of quoted firms in Nigeria with a 
view of ascertaining the ability of IFRS to envelop other voluntary disclosures.   
. 
References 
Adams, R. B., Hermalin, B. E. & Weisbach, M.S. (2009). The Role of Board of Directors in Corporate 
Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey. Charles A Dick Fisher College of Business Working Papers 
No. 228/2009. 
Adeyemi, B. S. & Fagbemi, T. O. (2010). Audit Quality, Corporate Governance and Firm Characteristics in 
Nigeria. International Journal of Business and Management, 5(5):169-17. 
Ahmadu, S; Aminu, M. & Tukur, G. (2005). Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Firm Financial 
Performance in Nigeria. AERC Research paper, 149, African Economic Research Consortium, Nairobi.  
Ahmed, K., Hossain, M. & Adams, M. (2006). The Effects of Board Composition and Board Size on the 
Informativeness of Annual Accounting Earnings. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 14 (5): 418-
431. 
Akhtaruddin, M, Hossain, M.A, Hossain, M. and L. Yao.(2009) Corporate Governance and Voluntary 
Disclosure in Corporate Annual Reports of Malaysian Listed Firms. Journal of Applied Management Accounting 
Research,7 (1). 
Barako, D. G. (2007). Determinants of Voluntary Disclosures in Kenyan Companies Annual Reports. African 
Journal of Business Management, 1(5):113-128. 
Berndt,T. & Leibfried, P. (2007). Corporate Governance and Financial Reporting. Corporate Ownership and 
Control, 4(4) Summer : 397-400. 
CBN (2003) Codes of Corporate Governance for Banks and other Financial Institutions in Nigeria.  
CBN (2006) Codes of Corporate Governance for Banks in Nigeria - Post Consolidation Era.  
Chavent, M., Ding, Y., Fu, L., Stolowy, H. & Wang, H. (2006).  Disclosure and Determinants Studies: An 
Extension Using the Divisive Clustering Method. European Accounting Review, 15(2):181-218.  
Cheng, C. & Courtenay, M. (2006). Board Composition, Regulatory Regime and Voluntary Disclosure. The 
International Journal of Accounting, 41(3):262-298.  
Chen, C. & Jaggi, B. (2000). Association Between Independent Non-Executive Directors, Family control and 
Financial Disclosures in Hong Kong. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Vol. 19(4)285-310.  
Chima, E.I. (2012). The Impact of Corporate Governance on Financial Reporting Disclosures of Quoted Firms in 
Nigeria. An Unpublished M.Sc. Thesis. Department of Accounting, Post Graduate School, University of Abuja 
Chow, C. W. & Wong – Boren. A. (1987). Voluntary Financial Disclosure by Mexican Corporations. The 
Accounting Review, 62 (3):533-541. 
Clemente, A.G. & Labat, B. N (2009). Corporate Governance and Voluntary Disclosures: The Role of 
Independent Directors on the Board of Listed Spanish Firms. Spanish Association of Accounting and 
Management.  
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.4, No.13, 2013 
 
176 
Cooke, T. E. (1989). Disclosure in the Corporate Annual Reports of Swedish companies.  Journal of Accounting 
and Business Research, 19(74):113-124. 
Dechow, P.M. Sloan, R.G. and Sweeney, A.P.  (1996). Causes and Consequences of Earnings  Manipulation: An 
Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC. Contemporary Accounting Research 
(Spring),13(1):1-36  
Donaldson, L. (1990). The Ethereal Hand: Organisational Economics and Management Theory. Academy of 
Management Review, 15(3): 369 – 381. 
Durbin, J and G.S. Watson (1951): “Testing for serial correlation in Least Squares Regression”. Biometrika, 
38:159-177.  
Durbin, J. (1970): “Testing for Serial Correlation in Least Square Regression when some of the Regressors are 
Lagged Dependent Variables”. Econometria, 38: 410-421. 
Eisenberg, T. S., Sundgren, & Wells, M. (1998). Larger Board Size and Decreasing Firm Value in Small Firms. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 48(1),35-54. 
Fama, E.F. ( 1980).  Agency Problems and the Theory of The Firm. Journal of Political Economy, 88(2):288-307  
Fama, E.F. & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Separation of Ownership and Control. Journal of Law and Economics, 26: 
301-325 
FASB, (2008). http//www.fasb.org/intl/convergance_iasb.shtm 
Field, A. (2006).  Discovering statistics using SPSS for windows. London.  Sage publications.   
Forker, J. (1992). Corporate Governance and Disclosure Quality. Accounting and Business Research, 
22(86):111-124.  
Ghofar, A. & Sarasvati. E. (2009). Financial Reporting Problems: The Analysis of Quality of Disclosure and the 
Measurement System of the Traditional Accounting. International Symposium on Finance and Accounting 
Malaysia.  
Glassman, C.A.(2003). Obstacles to Good Financial Reporting. Speech by U.S Securites Exchange Commission. 
American Enterprise Institute. Washington DC . 
Ho, S. & Wong, K. S. (2001). A study of The Relationship between Corporate Governance Structures and the 
Extent of Voluntary Disclosure. Journal of International Accounting, Auditing & Taxation, 10(2)139-156 
Hongxia, L. & Ainian , Q. (2008). Impact of Corporate Governance on Voluntary Disclosure of Chinese Listed 
Firms. Retrieved from www.ssrn.com  
IASB (2006). Preliminary Views on an Improved Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting: The Objective 
of Financial Reporting and Qualitative Characteristics of Decision-useful Financial Reporting Information, 
Discussion Paper, Retrieved from www.iasb.org.  
Jensen, M. (1993). The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems. The 
Journal of Finance, 25(3)831-873 
Jensen, M. & Meckling, W. (1976). Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Corporate 
governance. Journal of Financial Economics, 3:305-360.  
Kang, H., Cheng, M. & Gray, S. j. (2007). Corporate Governance and Board Composition: Diversity and 
Independence of Australian Boards. Journal of Corporate Governance, 15(2)194-207 
Khodadadi, V, Khazami, S. and Aflatooni, A. (2010). The effects of Corporate Governance structures on the 
extent of Voluntary Disclosures in Iran. Business Intelligence Journal,3(2):151-164. 
Klai, O. & Omri, A. (2011). Corporate Governance and Finnancial Reporting Quality. The case of Tunisian 
Firms. International Business Research,4(1):158-167. Downloaded from www.ccsenet.org/ibr. 
Levitt, A. (2000). Renewing the Covenant with Investors. Speech at New York University Center for Law and 
Business. http://www.sec.gov/news/speeches/spch370.htm  
Lim, S, Matolcsy, Z, and Chow, D. (2007). The Association Between Board Composition and Different Types of 
Voluntary Disclosures. European Accounting Review,16(3):55-583. 
Lipton, M. & Lorsch, J.W. (1992). A Modest Proposal For Improved Corporate Governance. Business Lawyer, 
48:59-77.  
Meek, G. C., Roberts, B. and Gray, J. (1995). Factors influencing voluntary annual report disclosures by U.S., 
U.K. and Continental European multinational corporations. Journal of International Business Studies, 26(3):555-
572. 
Miaoulis, G and Michener, R. D (1976).  An introduction to sampling, Dubuque, Iowa, Kendall/Hunt publishing 
company.  
Monks, R.A.G. & Minow, N. (1995). Corporate Governance on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value. Journal 
of Financial Economics, 20:293-315.  
Norwani, N. M ., Mohamed,  Z. Z. & Chek, I.T (2011). Corporate Governance Failure and its Impact on 
Financial Reporting Within Selected Companies. International Journal of Business and Social Science,Vol.2  
OECD (1999): “Principles of Corporate Governance”, http://www.encycogov.com/  
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.4, No.13, 2013 
 
177 
Peasnell, K., Pope, P. & Young, S. (2000). Accrual Management to Meet Earnings Targets: UK Evidence Pre- 
and Post-Cadbury. British Accounting Review, 32, (Elsevier):415-445. 
Raffournier, B. (1995).  The Determinants of Voluntary Financial Disclosure by Swiss Listed Companies. 
European Accounting Review, 4(2):261-280. 
Roberts, C., Weetman, P. & Gordon, P. (2002). International Financial Accounting: A Comparative Approach 
(2nd Edition). London: Pearson Education Limited.  
SEC (2003) Code of Corporate Governance for listed Companies in Nigeria. www.sec.gov.ng  
SEC (2006) Code of Corporate Governance for listed Companies in Nigeria.  www.sec.gov.ng  
SEC (2009) Code of Corporate Governance for listed companies in Nigeria.www.sec.gov.ng   
SEC (2007). A seminar Paper on “The Incidence of Inaccurate Corporate Financial Reporting in Nigeria Capital 
Market: The Role of Securities and Exchange Commission in Preventing Future Occurrences”, Ibadan. 
Shareholders association, Ibadan.  
Uadiale, O. M. (2010). The Impact of Board Structure on Corporate Financial Performance in Nigeria. 
International Journal of Business Management. 5(10):155-166.  
Umoren  , A. O. (2010). Accounting Disclosures and corporate Attributes in Nigeria Listed Companies. 
Unpublished Thesis Work. Dept. of Accounting, Convenant University , Ota.  
Umoren  , A. O. & Okougbo, P. (2011). Corporate Governance, Company Attributes and Voluntary Disclosures: 
A study of Nigeria Listed Companies. International Journal of Research in computer Applications and 
Management. 1(2) April.  
Vafeas, N. (2000). Board Structure and The Informativeness of Earnings. Journal of Accounting and Public 
Policy, 19:139-166.  
Vasques, F. (2006). Governance Practices and Transparency in Spain. Downloaded from efflora@usc.es. 
http://venus.unive.it/bauhaus/Flora Muino.  
Wallace, R. S. O. (1988).  Corporate Financial Reporting in Nigeria. Accounting and Business Research, vol. 
18(72)352-362.  
Wan Zanani, W. A., Shahanaz, I. &  Nurasyikan, J.N. (2008). The Impact of Board Size, Ownership and CEO 
Duality on Audit Quality: The Malaysian Evidence. Malaysian Accounting Review. 7(2):17-28  
Wang, H. & Zezhen , M. (2011). Analysis on Impact of  Corporate Governance to voluntary Disclosures- Based 
on  the Empirical Data of  Chinese Real Estate Industry. Accounting School, Capital University of Economy and 
Business, Beijing, P.R.China.  
Whittington, G. (1993). Corporate Governance and the Regulation of Financial Reporting. Accounting and 
Business Research, Corporate Governance Special Issue, 23(91a):311-319.   
World Bank (2004). Report on the Observance of standards and codes (ROSC). Nigeria Accounting and 
Auditing . http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/rosc_nga.pdf   
Xiao, H. & Yuan, J. (2007). Ownership Structure, Board composition and Corporate Voluntary Disclosure: 
Evidence From Listed Firms in China. Managerial Auditing Journal, 22(6):604-619   
Xiao, J. Z., Yang, H. & Chow, C. W. (2004). The Determinants and Characteristics of Voluntary Internet-Based 
Disclosures by Listed Chinese Companies. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 23(5):351-379.   
Yermack, David (1996). Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors”.  Journal of 
Financial and Economics, 40(2):185-211.  
Zhou, M.M. & Panbunyuen, P. (2008). The Association Between Board Composition and Different Types of 
Voluntary Disclosures: A Quantitative Study of Chinese and Swedish Listed Companies. An Msc Thesis.   
Zucker, L.G (1987). Institutional Theories of Organization. Annual Review of Sociology. 13:443-464.  
 
Appendix: Disclosure Checklist   
1 Brief history of the company   
2 Background information about Board of Directors   
3 Educational qualification/Academic level of Board of Directors   
4 Names and information about management staff  
5 Information about Remuneration committee   
6 Information about Nomination committee    
7 Information about Risk Management committee   
8 Information on Attendance and frequency of Board meetings  
9 Information a on Attendance and frequency of Audit Committee meetings 
10 Corporate social responsibility Report   
11 Corporate Governance Report   
12 Performance indicators for the past 5years using graphs / charts   
13 Share Capitalization history   
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14 Dividend capitalization history / unclaimed dividends  
15 Nigeria Stock Exchange quotation/ Share price at year end   
16 Profitability ratios (ROCE, ROA)   
17 Price earning (P/E) ratio    
18 Information on Dividend Cover   
19 Company policy and Information on Research and Development  
20 Information on Net Assets per Share   
21 Market Capitalization at year end  
22 Information about corporate social responsibility   
23 Information about Corporate governance 
24 Donation analysis  
25 Financial highlights with comparative percentage changes   
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